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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Standard economics have been challenged in the last decades by models and theories 
where concepts and insights from other sciences are incorporated into the economics 
analysis. People do not always act like standard economic theories would imply so 
individuals do not always try to maximize their utility rationally. In economics it is 
known that peoples’ behavior and decisions are also influenced by other factors than 
just utility or price, or the risks. Because the models are formalized in a precise 
manner, the concepts they employ have also to be structured. Most economists have 
been very careful in expanding the concept of economics and the theory is developing 
slowly. Lately many noneconomic motivations have been considered in or together 
with the economic analysis. (DellaVigna 2009.) As economic models and the 
frameworks are defined accurately, in order not to deviate too far from the basic 
features, the new incorporated concepts should also be defined in this fashion. There 
is always some limitations and restrictions in a model or a framework, so something 
has to always be omitted, so that other factors can be optimized. Behavioral 
economics is the new research field where these noneconomic theories are used in 
economic setting. It tries to better explain the behavior of people. Sometimes these 
departures lead far from the original models, as additional aspects from psychology, 
sociology or even neurology are added into the analysis. Fairly recently behavioral 
economics has introduced cognitive bias and other psychological findings. Identity 
economics brings now the social context into the economics analysis. (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2010.) 
 
In recent decades the concept of identity has widely been studied in psychology, social 
psychology and sociology and it is considered to be a major force driving individuals’ 
behavior. In economics the concept of identity had been considered only in a few 
studies until George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2000) presented their general 
framework for identity economics in the paper “Economics and Identity”. They follow 
the methodology of Gary Becker (1957), who was the one of the first to expand the 
standard utility function to cover also noneconomic motivations for behavior. Their 
concept of identity is based on social categories to which people belong to and which 
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have ideal characteristics and behavioral norms for their members’ conduct, guidelines 
about how one should look or act as member of these groups. They incorporate 
identity as an explanatory variable into a standard utility function analysis so that 
people have a new payoff for actions through identity. Of course a change in the social 
categories or the behavioral norms related to these categories can affect the payoffs. 
The concept of identity they incorporate is defined explicitly and therefore is relative 
easy to add into the economic theory (Akerlof and Kranton 2010.)  
 
Identity is a commonly understood concept, which here is determined to describe how 
one individual sees himself as a person, his self-image. Social identity refers to a 
person’s identity in a social context describing how he sees himself as a member of a 
group and how he shares the identity of the group. Identity and especially social 
identity have been studied extensively in psychology, social psychology and also 
sociology. Akerlof and Kranton base their concept of identity on psychology’s social 
identity approach, which dates back to 1970s and especially to works of Henry Tajfel 
and John Turner. This approach consists of two theories, of social identity theory and 
of self-categorization theory. Social identity theory explains behavior on intergroup 
level, where people in order to achieve a positive social identity seek positive 
distinctiveness for their in-groups compared to out-groups. The self-categorization 
theory in turn explains behavior on an intragroup level. It explains how different 
people under particular circumstances are able to become, act, think and feel as a 
psychological group. (Haslam 2001.) 
 
The purpose of this paper is to show how economics together with the concept of 
social identity can explain decision-making. The essential literature about identity and 
economics shall be presented together with the empirical findings that support the 
framework.  The main focus shall be on George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2000), 
who were the first to make a general framework for identity economics. Incorporating 
the concept of identity as an explanatory variable into a utility function which 
describes people’s behavior creates new payoffs for actions and therefore new ways to 
explain the behavior that is observed and gives more insight into why people actually 
behave like they behave. These new ways of explaining are then supported with 
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examples and empirical observations. After the first paper, Akerlof and Kranton have 
used the same framework and created more specific models to explain behavior in 
education, why students behave as they do, and also to explain economics of 
organizations, how workers relate norms in a workplace and how their behavior could 
be motivated.  
 
The criticism the identity economics framework has received concentrates to the 
concept of identity they use. Akerlof and Kranton refer to the concept of individual’s 
identity as if it would be the total identity of a person, but since the identity is based 
mainly on social context, the individual’s personal identity, his sense of self without 
others, is omitted in the analysis. In his critique Davis presents an inverted 
modification of the model as a solution to the problem of using the term “whole 
identity.”  (Davis 2007.) My conclusion is that Akerlof and Kranton’s framework should 
be considered as a social identity economics framework, so that the constraining the 
concept of identity to a social setting explicitly clear. This paper is therefore limited to 
consider the overall framework presented by Akerlof and Kranton, the literature in 
social psychology and economics to which their concept is based on and the empirics 
that support this addition to the standard economics thinking.   
 
In the next section a short review of the histories for the experimental economics and 
for the social identity approach is presented. The third section consists of the 
framework and formal model of identity economics by Akerlof and Kranton with the 
different ways how it extends the standard utility function analysis. In the fourth 
section the novel implication of this class of models on explaining behavior is then 
reviewed in light of empirical studies and observations. In the fifth sections I present 
an example how the Identity Economics -framework can be used to explain the 
economics of organizations and work incentives. In the sixth section the criticism 
against to the framework and the concept of identity it uses are presented. The 
seventh section summaries the paper and the analysis and I present my conclusions. 
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2 EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITY 
APPROACH  
 
Behavioral economics is a new research field in economics research where theories 
and concepts from other social sciences are introduced into economic models. The 
trend is to challenge the standard economic theories and the concept of homo 
economicus1, which in many empirical studies fails to explain the actual behavior of 
people, by incorporating cross-discipline theories and noneconomic motivations into 
these models. (See DellaVigna 2009.) By challenging the existing theories with these 
updates and departures from standard models, behavioral economics tries to bring 
economic models closer to reality, with the observations of economic and social life 
and transforming existing theory. The motivation of incorporating noneconomic 
concept of identity into the standard utility function of economics is the same, since as 
like overall “in behavioral economics, a large body of experimental research informs 
our theory. Experiments in social psychology, and now increasingly in economics, show 
that individual’s behavior depends on who people think they are.” (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2010.) 
 
Gary Becker was one of the first ones to expand the standard utility function to 
consider also other than economic topics like social problems. Akerlof and Kranton’s 
utility function in their Identity Economics -framework looks similar to the extended 
utility function of Becker's time allocation modelling strategies. (Davis 2007.) The 
concept of identity they use is based largely on social identity approach. This approach 
consists of two theories: the social identity theory developed largely by Henri Tajfel 
and the self-categorization theory developed by his associate John Turner (Haslam 
2001). In the next chapters the histories and backgrounds for these theories are 
presented. 
 
                                                        
1 Economic man, who is rational and self-interested individual, who is capable to make judgments on 
their subjectively defined ends. 
https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Homo_economicus.html 
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2.1.1 Experimental Economics 
 
Experiments have brought a significant change into the methodology of economics just 
in a few decades. The discipline of economics where experimental methods were 
considered irrelevant and ineffective is now using them to create further 
advancements into its theory. Experimental economics is a product of both massive 
investments in science and the positive intellectual culture and socio-political 
conditions in the 1940s and 50s in the United States. Because of the scattered nature 
of several independent and only partly intervened studies and the highly 
interdisciplinary character of them, it is hard to point out the actual beginning for 
experimental economics. Some key studies can be pointed out, which have established 
the approach for using investigation as a method in economics. (Guala 2008.) 
 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) and 
the developments of game and decision theory that followed are major influencers to 
the history of experimental economics. Game theory is often considered as a 
contribution primarily to the theoretical corpus of contemporary economics, but it 
created basis for a variety of approaches and research methods which were used 
across discipline boundaries to solve scientific, policy and management problems. 
When game theory increased in popularity gaming, playing the game theoretical 
questions for real spread elsewhere from University of Princeton where it was 
originally practiced. The positive attitude of combining formal theories with various 
kind of empirical evidence can be found in writings of some of the pioneers of game 
theory (see Schelling 1960 and Shubik 1960). (Guala 2008.) 
 
In 1952 in Santa Monica a two-month seminar devoted to ”The Design and 
Experiments in Decision Processes” was held. It was organized by researchers from the 
University of Michigan with sponsorship from Ford Foundation. Members of the RAND 
Corporation, a nonprofit global policy think tank supported by the US Air Force, also 
participated mostly because they had been conducting various game-theoretic 
experiments. Although the seminar did not directly inspire experimental papers it 
raised the topic to larger awareness among scientist. (Guala 2008.) Lawrence Fouraker 
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and Sidney Siegel (1960) published a book about their experiments of investigating 
bargaining behavior with large systematic variations both in the monetary payoffs and 
in the information given to the subjects of these experiments. Two remarkable points 
in their system design were the importance of using real money incentives to motivate 
subjects as well as the implementation of strict anonymity between the subjects. 
(Guala 2008.) One of the first monographs of experimental decision theory was 
published at same time (Davison et al. 1957). Also one of the most famous 
experimental discoveries of this period was made by Maurice Allais, who questioned 
the consistency of expected utility model (Allais 1953).2 Reinhard Selten used empirical 
evidence combined with the theory to introduce new solutions for important social 
science problems (Selten 1995).  In the 1950s also Vernon Smith started conducting 
experiments to test properties of different market institutions and the robustness of 
”no convergence” results to variations in the exchange institutions with repetition of 
the task (Smith 1962). Smith also co-operated with Siegel and introduced many of his 
insights of experimental design into his own work which lead to new characteristics of 
economic experimentation (see Smith 1981, Smith 1992) (Guala 2008). 
 
In the 1970s the exhaustion of general equilibrium theory (see Rizvi 2005), the 
expanding disillusionment of econometrics and the turmoil in macroeconomics created 
conditions for experimental economics to grow (Guala 2008).  Preference reversal 
theory based on seminal experiments of Sarah Lichtenstein and Paul Slovic (1971) was 
introduced also into economics literature (Grether and Plott 1979).  In 1974 an article 
was published about judgment and the heuristics and biases that limit the rationality 
of decision making (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Smith (1976) was the first one to 
introduce articulations of principles trying to systematize the methodology of 
economic experiments. These were then expanded when Smith adopted the principles 
of a microeconomic system by Leonid Hurwicz where economic mechanism can affect 
the outcome (Smith 1982). These experiments with their results and consolidation in 
the field have led into creation of behavioral economics. Different fields of behavioral 
economics are unified by a substantial project of revising the economic theory and 
                                                        
2 Allais later returned to expected utility theory and published his results also in English (Allais and 
Hagen 1979). 
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using experimentation as major source of evidence. It should still be noted, that 
”experimental economics refers primarily to method of investigating”, and although it 
is often source for behavioral economics, they are not the same thing. (Guala 2008.) 
 
In the 1950s the modern approach of broadening of economics to cover also other 
motivations for behavior observed in real life began with Gary Becker. In 1957 in his 
book “The Economics of Discrimination” Becker studied the market implications of the 
consequences of discrimination by whites against blacks. (Becker 1957.) He 
incorporated a new variable into the analysis, which measured the taste for 
discrimination, creating a new utility function. According to the analysis, people must 
act as if they were willing to directly pay something or to suffer in the form of reduced 
income to be associated with some people over others. (Becker 1971.) Becker studied 
such preferences and their effects in labour markets. The result of his study was that 
competitive marketplace eliminates the effects of discrimination. This is because firms 
that hire the most efficient workers will replace the companies that discriminate 
employees. (See Becker 1957 and Becker 1971.) Becker later studied also other kind of 
behaviour using the same methodology and by changing the utility function also to 
explain other noneconomic motivations. He showed how economics can explain also 
behaviour, such as crime, fertility, marriage and addiction (see Becker 1968, Becker 
1981, Becker 1993a, Becker 1993b; and Becker and Murphy 1988). (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2010.) 
 
2.1.2 History of Social Identity Approach 
 
In 1945 a psychologist Muzafer Sherif made an experiment with his colleagues and 
took eleven-year-old schoolboys from Oklahoma City to Robbers Cave State Park.  The 
boys were divided into two groups, and the groups were isolated from each other for a 
week. During that time they created distinct group identities. By the end of the week 
when these two groups were brought together to play competitive games, the groups 
acted hostile towards each other.  The boys differentiated themselves from the other 
group with name-calling and mischief. (Sherif et al. 1954.) This experiment of Sherif 
and other experiments that followed have showed that assigning unacquainted people 
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into groups and putting these groups into competition produces ethnocentrism and 
the phenomena of group conflict. So it had been shown, that for creation of 
ethnocentrism the objective group competition was sufficient condition. This was then 
studied further by Henri Tajfel, when he studied whether it was “a necessary condition, 
whether it was the minimal case.” (Brown 1986, P.543.) 
 
In 1971 Tajfel and his associates made an experiment on Bristol schoolboys, where the 
boys were shown slide projections containing various numbers of dots in them and 
asked to estimate the amount of them. The boys were then divided into two groups, 
namely underestimators and overestimators, for the second task which was a point 
allocation game. The actual division between the groups was made randomly but that 
was not told to the subjects. In the second tasks boys then allocated points, which 
were exchangeable for money, to others with just the information of all relevant group 
memberships.  They knew their own group and group memberships of the other 
anonymous participants to whom they allocated points. The basic result was in-group 
favoritism, since the average number of points allocated to assigner's in-group 
members was higher for both groups. (Tajfel et al. 1971.) “In-group favoritism is a sign 
of preference for the in-group over the out-group, and so is a form of ethnocentrism.” 
The schoolboys were surely linked in various ways before the experiment, but none of 
these groups had any meaningful link to this new imposed and arbitrary classification. 
“As underestimators and overestimators the boys had no prior history.” (Brown 1986, 
p. 543 .) 
 
In the second experiment in 1971 the subjects were shown reproductions of abstract 
paintings of Paul Klee and Wassily Kadinsky in order to make the basis for the random 
groupings. Paintings were projected in pairs and subjects expressed their preferences 
between anonymous artworks. Subjects then were divided into Kadinsky or Klee 
fanciers and told their group memberships before the point allocation game. Again, 
although the actual division into groups was again made randomly, both groups 
showed consistent in-group preference. (Brown 1986, p. 545.) Although these two 
experiments were almost minimal in their setting, but still in both two grouping factors 
operated: firstly the explicit group assignment for the subjects and secondly the 
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supposed similarity the groupings were said to be based. The supposed similarities 
alone can create groups and in-group preferences without explicit talk of the groups, 
but what is surprising is that using actual minimal conditions by dividing people into 
groups so that people know the division to be random and giving those groups trivial 
names like ”A’s” and ”B’s”, people still show full group preference effect. (Billig and 
Tajfel 1973 and Locksley, Ortiz and Hepburn 1980.)  ”The ultimate minimal condition is 
assignment to a group on a random basis.” (Brown 1986, p. 545.) 
 
”One of the most consistent and psychologically telling result in all this research is the 
preference for a maximal in-group advantage over the out-group, even at the sacrifice 
of total in-group rewards” (Brown 1986, p. 550). These results, that group division 
matters, were later on tested and proven to be effective also when monetary stakes 
were involved. Chen and Li (2009) divided the subjects into two groups and the tokens 
they gave to the subjects could be redeemed for real money. Subjects could now at a 
cost for themselves to punish or reward the other player when divided into pairs for a 
strategic game. Subjects rewarded the members of the same group more and also 
punished the members of the other group more, presenting in-group preferences. 
(Chen and Li 2009.) 
 
The fundamental claim made by Tajfel (1981) and by Tajfel and Turner (1979) is that 
when people are assigned into groups, they automatically and almost reflexively think 
of that group as an in-group and consider it to be better than the alternative. This is 
because they are motivated to achieve and maintain a positive self-image. The self-
image consists of two components: personal identity and multiple social identities.3 
The theory of social identity (see Tajfel 1972, 1974, 1981, Tajfel and Turner (1979), and 
Turner (1975)) assumes that individuals can make an effort to improve their self-image 
by enhancing either their personal or their social identity. This in-group preference can 
be seen for example in cultural affirmation, where affirming one's culture is good for 
all the individuals whose culture is being affirmed. (Brown 1986, p. 551.) 
 
                                                        
3 Identity is a definition that no one has defined with precision, but which is roughly understood by 
everyone (Brown 1986). 
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The previously described social identity theory is closely related with another theory in 
social psychology, the self-categorization theory. Like John Turner emphasizes in the 
foreword of Alexander Haslam’s book Psychology in Organizations (2001): using term 
“social identity approach” is appropriate since these two ”theories are complementary 
and related, but they are different, defined by different core hypothesis and different 
problems.”  While social identity theory explains the intergroup relations the self-
categorization theory (see Turner 1978, 1982, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and 
Wetherell 1987) is a theory of psychological group. The fundamental psychological idea 
of social identity theory is that when people make social comparisons on a group level, 
they in order to achieve positive social identity seek positive distinctiveness for their in-
groups compared to out-groups. As social identity theory explains behavior on 
intergroup level, the self-categorization theory in turn explains it on an intragroup 
level. It explains how different people under particular circumstances are able to 
become, act, think and feel as a psychological group. The psychological core idea is that 
people shift from individual to group psychology and behavior. This is also a shift from 
people defining themselves in terms of their personal identities to defining themselves 
more in terms of shared social identities they share. So in psychology's point of view 
people instead of behaving as individual personalities are able to behave collectively. 
(Haslam 2001.) 
 
 
3 IDENTITY ECONOMICS 
 
George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton (2000) incorporate “the psychology and sociology 
of identity into an economic model of behaviour.” In their framework the identity is 
based on social categories 4 , to which people belong to and which all have 
corresponding norms and prescriptions how people in these categories should behave 
and ideally look. (Akerlof and Kranton 2000.) After introducing the general framework 
for identity economics, Akerlof and Kranton have studied its relevance in the fields like 
                                                        
4 “Social categories are broad social science classifications used in academic research and by 
government agencies to describe widely recognized social aggregates” (Davis 2007). 
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education, Identity and Schooling: Some Lessons for the Economics of Education 
(2002), and later with theory of organizations: Identity and the Economics of 
Organizations (2005) and Identity, Supervision and Work Groups (2008). In 2010 they 
published a book Identity Economics: How our Identities shape our Work, Wages and 
Well-being (2010) which summaries all the different fields and papers where the 
Identity Economics -framework has been used.  
 
Like Becker who added noneconomic variables into standard utility functions without 
deviating far from it Akerlof and Kranton follow the same kind of mentality. They 
incorporate identity into a utility function and they use the utility function analysis to 
explain behavior where social context is partly motivating it. The incorporation of 
social identity creates new externalities for actions and therefore the new payoffs and 
results given by this extended analysis deviate from standard ones and can in some 
cases explain the observed behavior better. 
 
3.1 Identity Economic Literature 
Since the 1970s both in psychology and sociology the concept of identity has been 
extensively investigated, but in economics it has only recently received more attention 
(Davis 2007). Aguair at al. (2010) argue that the lack of identity in economics has been 
explained by appealing to the traditional concept of homo economicus (see Sen 1985, 
2004, 2006; Davis 2003; Basu 2006; Horst, Kirman, and Teschl 2006). (Aguiar et al. 
2010.) There exist few early contributors. Sen (1985) does not incorporate identity into 
a utility function, but mentions it as an influence on goal achievement. Folbre (1994) 
discusses the importance of gender identity for preserving the male privilege with 
collective action. Other connotations of identity in economics has been studied by 
Landa (1994) and Kevane (1994), who study how a group membership affects 
economic transactions when individual members are subject to group sanctions. 
Bowles and Gintis (1997) have studied cooperation within a community. In previous 
economic literature, norms were used with a little different notation, as they were 
seen to be obeyed since failure to do so would have resulted in punishment (see 
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Akerlof 1976, Kandori 1992 or Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite 1992). (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000.) 
 
More recent studies combining identity and economics have been with different 
approaches. Barret (2005) studied how individual’s social and moral identities affect 
their membership in different communities, groups and networks,  and how these 
identities and social affiliations affect their behavior, and how this all affects poverty. 
Darity et al. (2006) studied the relationship between racial identity formation and 
inter-racial disparities in both economic and noneconomic outcomes and found that 
identity norm formation imposes positive and negative externalities to each person’s 
actions. Davis (2003) focused on the role of an individual in economics and noted that 
there has been lack of attention given to it in economics. In a more recent paper he 
argues that in all these economic theories incorporating social identity approach into it 
has been “difficulties associated with failing to explain social identity and personal 
identity together” (Davis 2006).5 
Other later literature with the analysis of economic outcomes of identity studies racial 
conflict (Mason 2001; Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2003; Basu 2005 and Darity et al. 
2006), religious identity (Minkler and Cosgel 2004), trust and identity (Güth et al. 
2008), economic development (Basu 2006), identity and microfinance programs 
(Chatterjee and Sarangi 2004), symbolic good consumption (Dolfsma 2004 and Starr 
2004), integration in politics (Wichardt 2008) and law and identity economics (Hill 
2007). Also in a general theoretical model explaining beliefs of people and how those 
beliefs are interfered by preferences for identity, dignity and taboos, the concept of 
identity was combined with economics (Bénabou and Tirole 2007). (Aguiar et al. 2010.) 
 
3.2 Motivation for the Identity Economics Framework 
The normal garden-variety tastes for oranges and bananas are commonly viewed as 
being characteristics of an individual and a utility function is the mathematical and 
                                                        
5 His critique shall be presented more thoroughly in the sixth section. 
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formal expression that characterizes it in economics. It describes what people care 
about. Economists have used them in explaining not only income and consumption, 
but it can explain all kind of motivation. In today's economics also nonpecuniary 
motives like desire for children, the concern for status, and the concern for fairness 
and retribution are increasingly explained with economic analysis tools. Still most of 
the economists have maintained the assumption that tastes and preferences are 
individual and independent of social context. “This presumption ignores the fact that 
what people care about, and how much they care about it, depends in part on their 
identity.” In psychology the self, or ego, is a primary force driving individual behavior. 
Adding identity widens the representation of tastes since social context is incorporated 
into decision-making. (Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) 
In social psychological experiments the result has been, as presented earlier, that even 
most minimal group assignments affect behavior. Like in many other behavioral 
economics theories, the motivation that this framework should also consider the 
concept of social identity in its analysis is based on many empirical observations and 
cross-discipline theory. (Akerlof and Kranton 2010). Peoples’ identity, their sense of 
self, is formulated in the groups with which they identify. These groups therefore can 
have more influence to the behavior of an individual than the individual itself by 
determining the norms for acceptance or rejection or for solidarity and competence. 
(Aguiar et al. 2010.) Social identity connects individual's own image and actions to the 
ideal of the group and starts to affect their behavior. Internalized behavioral norms 
and the ideal characteristics, if violated, can create anxiety and cognitive dissonance. 
In turn acting accordingly to the norms can create a higher sense of self to the 
individual. (Aguiar et al. 2010.) “Norms are powerful source of motivation.” (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2010). The combination of identity, social categories, norms and ideals 
allows parsimonious modeling of how utility functions change as people see them in 
social context.6 (Akerlof and Kranton 2005, 13.) 
 
                                                        
6 This can be compared the framing effect, where utility depends on how the situation is framed (see 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
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3.1 Framework for Identity Economics 
 
Identity in Akerlof and Kranton’s framework is based on social categories and 
behavioral norms associated with each of these categories.7 Theory is based on a vast 
body of research on the salience of social categories for human behavior and 
interaction. (Akerlof and Kranton 2000.) Identity is used to describe person’s assigned 
social category, as well as well as persons’ self-image. “It captures how people feel 
about themselves, as well as, how those feelings depend upon their actions.”(Akerlof 
and Kranton 2005.) The concept of identity that Akerlof and Kranton employ in their 
framework and models is the psychology’s social identity approach (Davis 2007). 
 
3.1.1 Social Categories, Norms and Ideals 
 
In the formal language of the social sciences, people divide themselves and others into 
social categories. These social categories are associated with norms that state how 
people belonging to these categories should behave.8 (Akerlof and Kranton 2010, 11). 
In addition to prescriptions for behavioral conduct these norms may also describe an 
ideal for each category in terms of physical characteristics and other attributes. Adding 
identity as an argument into a utility function describing people’s behavior and 
decision-making, one’s actions have also identity-based payoffs for themselves as well 
as for others. By following the norms a person can bolster his own identity as well as 
identity of others in that category, but failure to “live up the ideal” would decrease the 
identity for both the person acting as well as all others observing this behavior in same 
category. (Akerlof and Kranton 2000.) Basically when adding identity as an argument 
into the utility function it means that every person belonging to a certain social group, 
whose members are associated with a certain code of conduct and ideal 
characteristics, now have a utility effect through identity.  
 
                                                        
7
In Akerlof and Kranton (2000) term prescriptions was used instead of norms, but in their later 
literature, they shift to use term norms for the same meaning. 
8
 In terminology used by Akerlof and Kranton should does not just imply ethical or moral views, but also 
the code of conduct how to behave according to the social codes, which can largely be internalized and 
even unconscious (Akerlof and Kranton 2010). 
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Gender is the most common example with two categories, male and female. 
Exemplary associated norms could be that males should be handsome and should not 
wear a dress, and females should be beautiful and wear a dress. Acting according to 
these norms people receive positive payoff in utility through identity, and when acting 
against these prescriptions they receive negative utility through identity. “Following 
the behavioral prescriptions for one’s gender affirms one’s self-image, or identity, as a 
“man” or as a “woman”. Violating these prescriptions evokes anxiety and discomfort in 
oneself and in others.” (Akerlof and Kranton 2000.) Sociologists often describe this 
behavior by referring to ideals, which are real or imagined characters that personify 
how someone in a given social category should behave. A person who identifies with 
being a member of a respective social category then loses utility insofar as her 
behavior differs from that of the ideal. (Akerlof and Kranton 2005.) 
 
Like seen in the previous empirical tests in social psychology on minimal conditions, 
the norms also affected the distribution in the point allocation game. ”As for norms or 
values, it is a good thing to be fair, we are told, and a good or better thing to be 
generous.” Subjects still were dominantly selfish for the in-group although they 
afterwards said that this strategy would be regarded socially as undesirable strategy. 
In many minimal group situation experiments the in-group favoritism has been the 
dominant strategy but not all-out, unqualified favoritism. Rational strategy for the 
schoolboys would have been the effort to try to maximize the number of points for all 
classmates from the previously unknown experimenter. (Brown 1986.) 
 
 
3.1.2 Internalization and Identification of Norms 
 
People have individualistic tastes in their utility functions, but as norms also enter into 
it, the social tastes start to matter also. Individuals acquire some of these tastes and 
learn some of these norms as members of their communities. These norms may be 
internalized through mechanisms of community approval and disapproval. Gossip, 
stories, and private and public censure are common ways of communicating and 
reinforcing norms. (Akerlof and Kranton 2010, 22) In psychology for personal 
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development the importance of internalization of rules for behavior is important, and 
when a person violates these norms that they consider their own, their feel anxiety. 
One’s own self should be defended against this anxiety so that disruptions would be 
limited and sense of unity would be maintained. (Thomas 1996.) So the psychologists 
say that people can internalize the norms, so the norms become their own and start to 
guide the behavior. Identification is a critical part of this internalization process: a 
person learns a set of values, prescriptions and norms, such that his actions should 
conform to the behavior of some people and contrast with that of others.  (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000.) “Norms are particularly clear when people hold an ideal of who they 
should be and how they should act.” (Akerlof and Kranton 2010, 11.) 
 
3.2 Formal Presentation of Identity Economics -Framework 
 
The standard utility function describing people’s behavior incorporated with the 
identity based on social categories and behavioral norms as an additional motivation 
for behavior is of the following form: 
 
(1)                 , 
 
where the total utility of  a person    depends on of his own actions,   , on the actions 
of others,    , and on his identity,   . Actions    and       determine the consumption 
of goods and services, and together with the utility function   they are sufficient to 
capture the standard economics of actions and externalities. (Akerlof and Kranton 
2000, 719.) 
 
Formally the identity of a person  ,   , is based on social categories, 𝐶. Every person   
has an assignment of people to these categories, 𝒄 . Person   may be mapped into 
multiple social categories, since categories need not to be mutually exclusive.  People 
have conception of their own categories as well as the categories of others, although 
the categorizations of oneself might not correspond to the mappings others give. 
Behavioral norms and ideal characteristics for different social categories, 𝑷, indicate 
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the appropriate behavior and attributes for people in different social situations. The 
identity that is argument in the utility function is defined as: 
 
(2)              𝒄     𝑷 , 
 
where the identity, the self-image, of person   depends on how his own actions,   , 
and the actions of others,    , correspond to the prescripted behavior given by the 
norms, P. It also depends on the social categories assigned to the person  , 𝒄 , and on 
his own characteristics, 𝜺 , and the extent to which those characteristics match the 
ideals for   's categories indicated by social norms 𝑷. Finally the identity depends also 
directly on the recognized social norms, 𝑷. (Akerlof and Kranton 2000.)             
3.3 How Identity Affects the Outcomes  
 
Adding the concept of identity into the utility function as an explanatory variable 
enriches the results given by the analysis. In the extended utility function the identity 
based on social categories with associated behavioral norms affect the payoffs of 
actions compared to a case without identity by creating new tradeoffs. The new 
externality of the action can now have either a positive or negative effect9 to the utility 
depending on if the action is according to or against the behavioral norms associated 
with the groups respectively. There exists four different ways through which the 
identity concept can affect the payoffs and drive people’s behavior compared to 
analysis without identity. Firstly people now have identity based payoffs from their 
own actions. Secondly people have also payoffs from actions of other people. Thirdly 
by changing the norms and ideals, one can affect the payoffs of actions and in this way 
affect the choices people make. The fourth way how the concept of identity can affect 
the payoffs is the actual choice of identity and the limitations for this choice. (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2000.) 
 
                                                        
9 Called the identity utility effect. Akerlof and Kranton used a term of ”gains or losses in identity”, 
whether the new externality through identity component increased or decreased the total utility 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000).  
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3.3.1 Identity Based Payoffs of One’s Own Actions 
 
Adding the identity into a utility function creates an extra payoff for one’s own action. 
Compared to a standard case, people now have utility from an action directly from the 
action itself and in addition an externality through the identity part. Formally, the 
identity    depends on   , so the total utility (1) for an action consist of the action itself 
and how well it follows the behavioral norms and ideals of the social category the 
individual   belongs to. If the action one conducts is according to the norms, there is a 
positive externality through the identity and vice versa if the action contradicts the 
norms. So identity can either increase or decrease the utility of an action. If the utility 
through identity is large enough, |  |  |  |, it might change the payoff of an action 
totally compared to a case without identity.  This might help to explain behavior that 
people from other social groups observe as detrimental. People with other identities 
may seem to act maladaptively or even self-destructively, but the reason behind this 
kind of behavior maybe an attempt to bolster one’s identity or to salve a diminished 
self-image. (Akerlof and Kranton 2000.)  
 
The first example of this kind of an effect can be found everywhere where people have 
certain cultural norms stating how one should ideally look. Self-mutilation and 
mutilating one’s children’s appearances as an expression of identity is a type of 
behavior that can be explained with the framework. Changing one’s appearance either 
with tattoos, body-piercings (ear, nose, naval etc.), self-starvation, weightlifting and 
steroid abuse, plastic surgery, or with circumcision (both male and female) leaves 
“physical markers of belonging to more or less explicit social categories and groups.” 
So the norms and ideals, that certain social groups have, drive individuals to change 
their characteristics in order to match them. By doing this they gain a higher utility. 
The reason for this kind of mutilation could also be pecuniary rewards and interactions 
like marriage, but the “defense of these practices indicate the extent to which 
belonging relies on ritual, and people have internalized measures of beauty and virtue. 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000.) Wealthy parents for example try to maximize their 
offspring’s benefits by teaching them to foster the in-group identification with their 
own class. Being loyal and honest is important, although it might mean that “these 
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traits may in some circumstances cause the individual to engage in non-maximizing 
behavior.” (Akerlof 1983.) It has indeed be seen, that individuals can suffer large 
personal costs, if it profits the group to which they belong to (Dawes et al. 1990). 
 
Second good example is the gender related occupations and working in a business or a 
sector which is considered to be a workplace of the opposite sex. In the term of the 
model, working there contradicts the norms and therefore creates disutility, 
“ambiguous feelings about their work.” One study with female lawyers presents this 
contradiction. Although they considered themselves as women, they acted like men in 
order to be good in their work. They expressed their ambivalence about the situation 
where their working contradicted the norms in many discussions. (Pierce 1995.) 
Nurses and Marines give both genders a good example of stereotypical occupations. 
Marine Corps demands from the soldiers traits like strength, aggressiveness and 
emotional detachment, when as nursing is linked with qualities like nurturing, caring 
and passivity. Former traits are considered masculine, and later feminine. (Williams 
1989.)  
 
Other examples can range from the facing of the discomfort of mountaineering in 
order to enhance the individual’s own sense of self (Loewenstein 1998) to alumni 
giving. Alumni giving might not be the charity form bringing the highest marginal 
return and it might be that it enhances the reputation and value of the degree, but it 
also represents identity, when graduates give to their own Alma Mata (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000, 722). This framework was also studied in education. It was observed 
that the students had social categories: crowd leaders, nerds and burnouts, which all 
had behavioral norms. Students therefore were not just optimizing their effort, but 
they also tried to fit to their category. (Akerlof and Kranton 2002.) All of these are 
good examples were the utility of an action is compensated or increased by positive 
identity utility, even so that if the utility from the action itself is negative, the total 
utility can still be positive if the identity utility is positive and large enough.    
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3.3.2 Identity Based Payoffs of Actions of Others 
 
The concept of identity depends also on actions of others. Formally, the identity    
depends on    . This means that individuals have identity-based effects to their utility 
from the actions conducted by others. This is through the people observe the actions 
of others. If these actions are according to the behavioral norms or ideal 
characteristics, these actions support the already existing norms, which people have 
internalized creating positive identity utility. When the actions of others contradict 
these norms or ideals, it creates anxiety, negative identity utility, since the internalized 
norms are seen as less profound. This might result in action of retaliation, where one 
might try to salvage one’s questioned self-image, and so creates even further 
externalities.10  (Akerlof and Kranton 2000.) 
 
The first and obvious example is again the gender and norms related to it. Like in the 
previous example, dress is a symbol of femininity and if a man would wear  one, this 
would threaten the identity of other men, for the reason that the internalized norms 
would be contradict. This would now create negative identity utility to other men if 
one man would wear a dress11, this externality could also expand to other effects if 
other men would decide to retaliate in order to repair their loss of utility. The previous 
example of gender related workplaces has also the externality effect to others than 
just for the one working in a job that is considered to be job for the opposite sex. An 
example of this retaliation could be the sexual harassment of female co-workers in 
masculine workplaces, since men might feel their identity threatened and have 
decided to retaliate. (Akerlof and Kranton 2000.) 
 
This retaliation can be also a source for explaining the insults, hate crimes and 
violence. Insults, perceived or real, can create much violence or escalate racial and 
ethnic strife. (Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) In the 19th century United States men 
countered insults with retaliation, gentlemen would have engaged into a duel when 
                                                        
10 Simple game theoretical framework for these retaliations shall be presented at the end of this section 
11 Of course the man wearing the dress would have negative identity utility to himself also like stated 
previously about the identity utility payoff from own actions 
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the lower-class men would have fought with hands and fists. The result is that in the 
South of the United States a man’s reputation is central to his economic survival and in 
the South it is more acceptable to use violence in response to an insult, in order to 
protect home and property.  (Nisbett and Cohen 1996.) Same kind of distancing can be 
found also in school playgrounds, where children who behave differently are mocked 
and bullied (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).  
 
Positive examples of the in-group norms could be used to solve free-rider problems, 
where someone is trying to benefit from a resource, service or a good without paying 
for it. In economics this widely recognized problem is usually handled with public 
goods and covering the costs with taxation. (Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) One solution 
to the free-rider problem can be found in communities where people share norms for 
cooperation (see Ostrom 1990). Empirical research also supports the argument, since 
in communities that are more ethnically homogenous people make larger 
contributions to local public goods and education than in more diverse communities 
(see Alesina et al. 1999 and Miguel and Gugerty 2005). (Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) 
 
3.3.3 Changes in Norms and Ideals 
 
In a normal utility function analysis other factors are assumed to be constant in order 
to decide the optimal action. In the identity economics –framework the categories, 
norms and ideals have in previous analysis been assumed to be constants, but these 
notions may also change. Indeed, many people and organizations have incentives to 
change these behavioral norms or ideal characteristics, in order to get people to act 
differently and more favorably to them. In formal terms, they are either trying to 
change the given social categories,  , to which people belong to or the corresponding 
behavioral norms that are associated with these categories,  . Both of these are a part 
of the identity and therefore the changes in them affect the total utility. (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2010.) 
 
One obvious example is advertising, where companies try to induce people to 
consume more of their product or service. Advertisers both try to appeal to the 
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existing norms and to create new ideals.12 Cigarette advertisers try to promote the 
image of the ideal man or woman with a right cigarette, and in this way try to 
influence the norms that people observe, by trying to change the ideal. A good 
example of this change is the smoking habits of women. In the United States from the 
1960s when smoking was more acceptable for men to the 1990s when there no longer 
exists a difference between different sexes, and the transformation in the actions 
people conduct cannot be purely explained by standard utility function with desire for 
tobacco or nicotine. So the norms regarding women smoking have changed, and much 
by influence of tobacco companies advertising (Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) Other 
examples are the professional and graduate schools, where the student’s identities are 
changed in order to mold their behavior. In some fields like medicine, theology, 
military and the doctorate a tittle is added to the person’s name, implying a change in 
the person, as one’s identity has changed. (Akerlof and Kranton 2000.) 
 
Politics is also a good example of a field, where people are trying to affect the opinions 
of the others. Politicians and activists do not usually take the preferences of the voters 
as given, but try to change their identity and norms (for analysis and theory of politics 
and identity see Anderson (1983), Norton (1988) and Connolly (1991)). Romer (1994) 
considers the possibility that politicians can change the emotions of voters, especially 
their anger, and in that way affect the political outcomes. Racial and ethnical division is 
typical for populist and fascist leaders (see Glaeser 2005).  In history major changes in 
identity have spurred revolutions, in France subjects were changed into citizens and in 
Russia into comrades (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). 
 
3.3.4 Choice of Identity and the Limitations for it 
 
Identity utility,   , in the framework is based on social settings and so part of the 
identity-based utility derives from the social categories,   , and therefore the forth way 
how the payoffs can be changed through are the changes of one’s social categories. 
Identity itself can be a choice. One can to some extend choose the category one 
                                                        
12 For historical studies of advertising’s and other influences effect on gender and consumption (see De 
Grazia 1996). 
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belongs to. This change of category then also changes the payoffs given by the 
analysis, since also norms and ideals which one follows and values are changed. 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000.)  
 
Women in the U.S. could choose whether to be a housewife or to pursue a career 
(Gerson 1986), selecting partly the categories where they belong to, and also their 
identity, in the long run. This transformation can be seen in statistics also. In the 1970s 
only few teenage women expected to work at age of 35 and almost all college-
educated women used to take their husbands name. Today almost all women expect 
to be employed at that age and a significant group retains their surnames. (Goldin 
2006.) Second example is the choice of school that parents make for their offspring. 
Whether to send them in public or private school, and hence choosing the identity 
they would get with the new self-image and identification with others in the same 
group. (Akerlof and Kranton 2000.) Third example is the college dorms which are 
associated with certain “themes” like fraternities, sororities or African-American. Each 
of these creates certain social categories and is associated with behavioral norms and 
ideals. These then change how student think of themselves. (Sanday 1990.) For 
immigrants the citizenship is not just a legal issue but also an identity one. This is why 
the decision of change is often fraught with anxiety and even guilt. (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000.) 
 
Because identity is fundamental determinant of behavior, choice of identity may be 
the most important “economic” decision people make. Individuals may more or less 
consciously choose who they want to be. Some categories might have such norms and 
ideals that ethnical background or racial differences limit the chances of a person to 
pass into it.  In these cases those with nondistinguishing physical features may be able 
to pass in the group, but others are constrained by their appearance, voice or accent.  
Limits for this choice may also be the most important determinant of an individual’s 
economics well-being, since they would constraint the utility they can get. (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000.) 
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Changing one’s social categories may also create retaliations from others, as they see 
one member contradicting the norms by trying to change the groups and so devaluate 
other’s identity. Peers usually tease people who are seeking upward mobility (see 
Suskind 1998). (Akerlof and Kranton 2000.) 
 
 
3.4 Simple Game Theoretical Model 
 
A simple game theoretical model for describing people's behavior with identity based 
on social categories consists of two different actions, action One and Two. The utility 
of an action for a person who has the taste for it is V. If the person chooses the action 
they dislike, the utility is zero. Let’s assume that person A prefers the action One, and 
person B prefers the action Two. In a standard case, both individuals would perform 
the action they prefer in order to maximize their utility. Now adding two social 
categories in to the model creates the identity-based preferences. Let there be two 
social categories, Blue and Red. The behavioral norms dictate that Blues should 
perform the action One, and Reds the action Two. Conducting the action that is not 
prescribed creates negative utility, as one loses through identity the sense of self. Let 
this anxiety about losing one self's identity be denoted by   . Also others loose from 
the action of contradicting the behavioral norms, since their internalized rules of 
behavior are questioned. Let this be denoted by   . Person who observes action that 
contradicts the norms may choose to retaliate in order to repair his identity. This can 
be done at a cost, c, and it creates to the targeted person additional loss,  . (Akerlof 
and Kranton 2000.) 
 
Now assuming the simplest possible division of people, that both of the persons 
belong to category Blue, creates following game tree for the actions: 
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Figure 1  
Game Tree of Interaction for Two Person Game with Option to Retaliate  
(Akerlof and Kranton 2000.) 
 
 
As person A prefers the action One, he performs it always and therefore the other 
branch for the decision tree is omitted. Person B can either also perform the action 
One, gaining no utility from it, or engage into action Two. If person B chooses the 
action Two, he gains the utility  , but the person A has a change to retaliate in order to 
fix his own identity. Person A either suffers the loss of utility from the action of others, 
  , or he retaliates at the cost  . If Person A does not retaliate, Person B loses only his 
sense of self,   , but if Person A retaliates, the loss will consists of loss of sense of self 
and of the additional loss, (    ). There exist four possible subgame perfect 
outcomes: 
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1. When the cost of retaliation is smaller for person A than his loss of identity 
utility from other's action (    ), and the total losses for person B after the 
retaliation are larger than the utility from the action (      ), person A 
deters person B from action Two, since person A would retaliate: (One, One). 
 
2. When the cost of retaliation is smaller for person A than his loss of identity 
utility from other's action (    ), but the total losses for person B after the 
retaliation are smaller than the utility from the action (      ), person B 
chooses the action Two although person A retaliates: (One,Two). 
 
3. When the cost of retaliation for person A is larger than his loss of identity from 
other's action (    ), and the utility from the action for person B is larger 
than the loss of his own identity utility (    ), person A never retaliates and 
person B chooses action Two: (One,Two). 
 
4. When the loss of person B’s own identity is larger than the utility from the 
action (    ), person B never chooses the action Two: (One,One) (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2000.) 
 
 
All the four ways previously discussed how identity part affects the payoffs are present 
in this simple game theoretical model. Firstly person A has a positive utility from the 
action One and also a positive utility from identity while his action affirms his Blue 
identity. Person B in turn has either zero utility from the action One and positive 
identity utility from acting according to of the norms or positive utility from the action 
Two but also negative identity utility while contradicting the norms. Secondly the 
actions of others affect also the utility, so if the person B chooses the action Two and 
contradicts the norms that both have internalized, person A suffers negative identity 
utility. The models possibility to repair one’s negative identity utility from actions of 
others with a cost is what has been observed in gender workplaces or between ethnic 
groups. Thirdly by changing the norms and ideals one can shift the payoffs or even the 
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ideal actions associated with each group and therefore drive the behavior. The new 
norm after a rhetoric campaign could for example state that Blues can perform the 
action they want, and so neither person would face negative identity utility if person B 
would then choose action Two. Fourthly without any changes in norms or ideals there 
is the question whether the person B could change his social category, and his identity 
simultaneously, and be part of the group Red, then no negative identity utility would 
be created to persons from the B’s action Two, assuming there would be no negative 
utility from the process of changing categories. 
 
 
4 EMPIRICS OF SOCIAL IDENTITY ECONOMICS 
 
The social identity economics framework with the augmented utility function gives a 
good tool for analyzing different behavior observed in real life. One good field is the 
economics of organizations and the worker behavior, and how work incentives and 
working effort can be studied with this concept of social identity. Akerlof and Kranton 
(2005) made a more specified principal-agent model by using their framework where 
employees’ identities drive them to behave more or less in concert with the goals of 
the organizations. They later developed this even further to explain the effects of 
supervision and workgroup norms in a workplace (Akerlof and Kranton 2008). Accurate 
and subtle descriptions of motivations given by this specified model can be seen both 
in military and civilian workplace (Akerlof and Kranton 2005). 
 
4.1 Social Identity Economics in Organizations 
 
Incorporating the concept of identity into the economics of organizations can change 
the understanding of such policies as incentive pay and supervision. For employers 
Identity offers a supplement to monetary compensation which as only motivator for 
work can be infective and costly. (Akerlof and Kranton 2005). Current economics deals 
with the basic problems for businesses: how to give employees proper incentives. 
Owners or management have only limited sources of output statistics to which they 
 31 
can base their decisions about compensation levels. Rates like product failure 
percentage or the total amount of sales receipts could be this kind data. The higher the 
results are the higher the pay is. The theory gives a simple solution that workers should 
be given incentives with the variation of the pays, low or high, and on average be paid 
just enough to take the risk. (Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) 
 
In turn economic theories also suggest that these monetary incentives will not work 
properly in practice (see Prendergast 1999 and Gibbons 1998). There exist problems 
when trying to observe the information for basis of compensations. Often the output is 
not just work of one person but of team of people, so the product failure rate or the 
end of day sales receipts are not so strongly related to effort of individual worker. 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) If the whole team is responsible for success, without 
supervision, it is impossible to give individual worker their deserved compensation 
(Holmstrom 1982). Secondly many jobs consist of multiple tasks. If person's work is 
assessed just by some of the tasks, that person then concentrates mainly to these 
tasks. Thirdly when reward is based on relative performance, there does not need to 
be so much supervision as people are competing with each other, but competitive 
behavior can create other negative effects, like sabotage (see Lazear 1989). Finally the 
fairness that exists between workers, is one aspect why they will resist variations in 
monetary compensations (Akerlof and Yellen 1990). Using direct monetary 
compensation will game the employees so that “firms get what they pay for”, but since 
the criteria for the pay cannot be well targeted, firms might not actually get what they 
actually wanted.  One solution could be performance criteria on subjective level and 
repeated interactions, but in these cases the evaluated employees have incentive to 
influence the work of their supervisor. (Gibbons 1998.) 
 
Akerlof and Kranton suggest that identity is central to the efficiency of organizations, 
and that employees should be in jobs with which they identify and companies should 
promote such attachments. Management can change the behavior of employees. This 
claim is supported by classic works of sociology (see Barnard 1938 and Selznick 1957). 
This is also seen in more recent literature, Kogut and Zander (1996) study the role of 
the employee's identity for their motivation. Other study states that production is 
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enhanced in organizations where employees share its mission (see Prendergast 2003 
and Besley and Ghatak 2005).   
 
4.1.1 Military 
 
On the first day of military academy at West Point, called the R-day, the new cadets 
must stand and salute and repeat over and over again this statement until they get it 
perfectly right: “Sir, New Cadet Doe reports to the cadet in the Red Sash for the first 
time as ordered.” It is at this beginning of the four years of training that the new cadets 
surrender their old selves in stages. (Lipsky 2003.) At the West Point the Army aims to 
change the identities of the cadets, so that they would share the same goals as the U.S. 
Army. “This change in identity is a way to motivate employees, different than 
incentives from monetary compensation.”  Driving the identity is good motivator in 
situations and especially in fields like military, where the effort from a worker is either 
hard to observe or hard to reward. (Akerlof and Kranton 2005.) 
 
Military is then a typical example of an organization where soldiers as its workers are 
not motivated through monetary compensation, but through changing their values, 
their identities and their norms of how they should behave in a certain situations. This 
is relative easy for military since mostly the recruits in the US they are volunteers and 
are isolated from the civilian life. In history in the US Army and Navy the rank and pay 
have been based almost only on seniority (See Janowitx 1960, and Rostker et al. 1992) 
and today this non-dependence of monetary compensations is supported by the fact 
that pay differentials between officers with different ranks are much smaller than in 
corporate world (see Asch and Warner 2001). In military the soldiers are awarded from 
outstanding effort with medals instead of bonuses (see Besley and Ghatak 2005 and 
Frey 2007). (Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) 
 
In the terms of the social identity economics framework the army has incentive to 
change recruits' social categories, from civilians to soldiers, from outsiders into 
insiders, respectively. Insiders have certain behavioral norms and ideals, military code 
of conduct that prescribes how soldiers should or should not act. If they fail to live up 
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the ideal, they will lose identity utility. (Akerlof and Kranton 2010). According to leading 
military sociologist, ideal soldier should be “war oriented in mission, masculine in 
makeup and ethos, and sharply differentiated in structure and culture from civilian 
society (Moskos et al. 2001). Air Force ideal of “Service before Self” and the fact that 
officers must follow the rules of the organization and obey the orders given in the 
chain of command having “faith in the system” (Benton 1999), describe well the norms 
for the insiders. From a company point of view military makes an investment to change 
the categories with initiation rites, short haircuts, boot camps, uniforms and oaths 
creating common identity for the soldiers (see Bradley 1999). Harsh training is partly 
one of them, of course there is the direct benefits from learning of skills and 
developing physical form, but cognitive-dissonance theory from psychology suggest 
that it can also be an effective way to change soldiers’ social identities. Recruits must 
explain to themselves why such a treatment is acceptable for them and simultaneously 
when doing so they create a new self-image of themselves. (Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) 
 
Military discipline is also one aspect that supports the framework, since it can reveal a 
community's behavioral norms. Discipline proceedings do not just punish the 
offenders, but also define and inform the nonoffenders about proper conduct (Erikson 
1966.) Punishment is not just a fine, which is paid upon breaking the rules, but more of 
idealized response to discipline compared to that imagined responses of standard 
economics. Becker's (1968) fines, dismissals in efficiency wage models (Shapiro and 
Stiglizt 1984 and Becker and Stigler 1974) or the pay variations in principal-agent 
models give the agent optimization problem where discipline reduces income. There is 
no place in these models for the moral obligation of the agent.13(Akerlof and Kranton 
2005.) 
 
In military there also exists workgroups and related norms. The dilemma, whether unit 
leaders owe their allegiance to their men or to the higher command, is obvious one. 
Exemplary study is from Stouffer et al. (1949) form Second World War in which the 
officers, non-commissioned officers  and privateers were asked questions regarding 
                                                        
13 Harsh punishments also have direct role in the operation of successful military (Akerlof and Kranton 
2005). 
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appropriate disciplinary actions in different situations. One question was for example, 
which would be suitable punishment for bringing liquor bottle into the barracks. Soft 
action was considered appropriate by 70% of privates, 59% of NCOs and 35% of 
officers. This presents the same result as in all cases, that NCOs took the middle ground 
between the enlisted men and officers, showing the ambiguous position of supervisor. 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2008.) 
 
4.1.2 Civilian Workplace 
 
Social identity economics concept of insiders and outsiders can explain the how 
employees relate to the firm and how they could be motivated to work differently. In 
management literature the dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations is 
one of the central themes, and it matches the distinction of worker's into insiders or 
outsiders. Later management literature has studied the difficulties in observing of the 
efforts of the workers and emphasized the importance of individual and group 
motivations. Current literature underlines the role of management in changing the 
workers' objectives. Management by objective is the strategy where employees take 
part in setting their own goals, which aligns the objectives of management and 
workers to same. In terms of the model this would be described as insider sharing the 
goals of the company. (Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) 
 
 
The frameworks feasibility to explain also worker motivations and economics of 
organizations is supported by many empirical findings and studies. One study about 
company's commitment to customer service and quality of its products says that these 
efforts pay off, since when employees are proud of the company's products and 
services, they are more motivated (Peters and Waterman 1982). Bewley (1999) 
conducted a research in Connecticut, where he interview mostly smaller companies in 
the recession of early 1990s. The finding was that companies did not lower the 
workers’ pay although it would have been possible. The reasoning for this behavior 
was that the employees could identify with their firm and its objectives. (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2010.) Many other studies describe this categorization of employees either to 
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insiders or outsiders and the behavior following it (see Terkel 1974, Smith 2001, 
Juravich 1985, Newman 2000). The General Social Survey (GSS), an annual survey to 
about three thousand employees, had in 1991 module about work organizations. Most 
answers regarding how well employees shared the values and goals of the companies 
were considerably high and the answers only differed only a little bit between blue-
collar and white-collar jobs, or across races or genders. Of course these do not directly 
tell, if companies invest into identity, or if workers select jobs they identify with. It 
might also be in order to minimize the cognitive dissonance workers take the values of 
the firm as their own, but “all of these explanations fit our general framework.” 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) 
 
In addition to workers insider and outsider identities, many ethnographies have found 
out, that employee's related more often with immediate colleagues than to the firm as 
a whole. These ethnographies support also the fact, that these workgroups who are 
not monitored create norms that restrict output. With supervision firms can gain 
information and then adjust the incentive pay accordingly. Supervision is greatly 
resented by workers and they might adopt identity in opposition to the firm and 
therefore also require higher compensation for working in firm’s interests. Akerlof and 
Kranton (2008) studied with their framework how supervision and group identities at 
workplace affect the trade-offs. They followed “the social psychology of intrinsic 
incentives that depend on how workers see themselves in relation to the firm.” 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2008.)  
 
Frederick Taylor's view that management defines tasks, determines the best ways to 
perform them and then pay for that performance (see Hodson 2001) were questioned 
by the human relations movement in studies of organizational behavior which started 
in 1930s with the study of Western Electric Company by industrial sociologists Mayo, 
Roethlisberger and Dickson. The Bank Wiring Observation Room experiment shows 
that workers may respond to strict supervision with decline in effort. Small group of 
employees producing telephone switches in an isolated room was observed. A clear 
norm for output was established by the group, two switches per day. There were two 
different supervisors for the most of the experiment. When hard line supervision was 
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conducted, the workers retaliated by sabotaging the production, breaking the two 
machine per day norm. The resolution was that the supervisor was transferred to 
elsewhere. The other supervisor in turn was aware of this norm, and didn't report it 
forward, and the workgroup continued production with its own norms. (Homans 
1951.) One other classical example of workplace studies is the Alvin Gouldner’s (1954) 
Patterns in Industrial Bureaucracy, where the effect of change in management policy 
was studied in a wallboard plant. Old manager had relaxed management culture with 
good worker morale, perks that were formally against company rules and other flexible 
views towards material use, time stamping and holidays. This in the framework 
corresponds to the culture of no monitoring and a workgroup norms. After his death 
he was replaced by a new manager who exercised a strict and by-the-book 
management policy with strict supervision and trimming the perks given in the past. 
This created in the frameworks terms an outsider identity for the employees, since 
workers started to recent him and his policies.  (Akerlof and Kranton, 2008.) 
 
Loose supervision was seen in two studies where a small machine shop was observed 
25 years apart. Both studies give evidence about workgroup norms and loyalty. 
Workers had pay based on hourly wage and a job-specific piece rate. Aim of the 
management to make the piece rate equally difficult to achieve failed, and some jobs 
were easier than others. The workgroup norm was to make medium effort, so that 
they would not earn too much. Management turned blind eye to these norms, most 
likely since satisfactory results were gotten. The strategy for employees’ was to make 
out. (Burawoy 1979 and Roy 1953.) One statistical study of a heavy machinery plant in 
Midwest provides more evidence about workgroups and their norms. Employees were 
assigned to different jobs almost at random, noting that similar jobs might require 
similar characteristics. Index about workgroup cohesion constructed from 
questionnaires was analyzed against individual worker productivity. Data shows that 
variance in productivity among individuals in cohesive workgroups was lower than in 
non-cohesive workgroups. This supports the fact that in some workgroups the norms 
were affecting the employee behavior.  Study also showed effect of strict supervision, 
since employees gave also answers whether the foreman was near the men or the 
management. (Seashore  1954.) 
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5 FORMAL MODEL OF SOCIAL IDENTITY ECONOMICS FOR 
ORGANISATIONS, SUPERVISION AND WORKGROUPS 
 
In a basic economics model a worker’s utility depends on income and effort and there 
is no relation to how the employee considers oneself as a member of a firm. Akerlof 
and Kranton (2005 and 2008) made a more specified model from their previously 
presented framework of social identity theory. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) expanded 
the classical principal-agent model and introduced the framework of social identity 
economics to explain the employee’s behavior in organizations. In the model there is 
two people, owner of the firm, called principal and then the worker, called the agent. 
Worker as an agent can choose between two levels of effort, high and low. The 
likelihood that the firm will earn larger revenues is higher with high work effort. 
Principal does not have information about the level of the effort, but only sees the 
level of revenues. The principal can affect the worker by paying more if the revenues 
are of high level and less if they are low. (Akerlof and Kranton 2005 and 2008.) 
 
The standard economics would now derive the salaries depending on the level of 
revenues. Like in the social identity economics framework let us now assume that 
there exist two social categories for the worker, insiders and outsiders. Let these 
categories be associated with behavioral norms about the level of effort the group 
members should extract: insiders conduct high effort when the outsiders should 
conduct low effort. Insider's ideal is to make higher effort as he loses identity utility if 
he deviates from the ideal. Therefore it is not required to pay him so much extra for 
conducting the high effort. In this situation there shall be less difference between the 
wage levels. This difference in costs of efforts is not a new one, but the source, social 
identity, is a new reasoning for it. Outsiders in turn lose identity utility when making 
the high effort, and therefore should be compensated extra for that, and therefore the 
wage differential between the effort levels would be larger.  (Akerlof and Kranton 
2005.) 
 
For companies this creates incentives to induce insider identity into the workers, when 
the pay difference is great enough, since insiders are willing to work harder for lower 
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overall pay. It should be noted, that inducing this change with trainings and benefits 
can be costly. According to the framework, companies overall revenues are likely to be 
higher, when they invest into worker identity in situations when: inculcating identity is 
not costly, observing worker's effort is hard, output or revenues are depended on  
special efforts on peak seasons, workers dislike risk, economic uncertainty exists or the 
high effort is crucial for the company's output. (Akerlof and Kranton 2010.) 
 
5.1 General Case of Employees as Insiders or Outsiders 
 
The new model incorporated social categories and behavioral norms of a workplace 
into the analysis of workers’ actions and their incentives. In the model, the basic 
principal-agent setup between firms and their employees described previously 
captures the current economic thinking of motivation in organizations. “The firm 
wishes to devise the optimal contract to maximize its expected profits, which are 
expected revenues net of expected wage payments. The contract will optimally trade 
off worker’s wages, which reduce firm’s profits, against incentives for work, which 
increases the firm’s revenues. The worker wishes to maximize expected utility.” Let the 
worker have two effort levels from which to choose from denoted by A and B, high-
effort action and low-effort action respectively. Let those both actions have costs for 
the worker, cost eA for the high-level effort and for the low-effort action cost eB, where 
eA> eB. To give a worker an incentive to take the high-effort action, the firm will pay 
high wage when they observe high revenues and low wage when it observes low 
revenues. With a sufficient large difference in the wages, the worker will do the high-
effort activity.  (Akerlof and Kranton 2005.) 
 
 
Following the framework previously presented  and now adding the social identity in 
form of social categories gives the worker possibility to take one of two identities: 
insider, N, or outsider, O. As stated before both of these identities are associated with 
corresponding behavioral norms. The insider should by the behavioral prescriptions 
conduct the high-effort activity, A, and deviation from this would create loss of identity 
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for them. The outsider in turn has a norm stating that the conducted action should be 
of low-effort, B. Limiting the categories for now to two, c = N or O, the general utility 
function with social identity framework for the worker is of the following form: 
 
(3)                     | 
      |, 
 
where     is the diminishing marginal utility from income, e is disutility from the 
chosen effort, Ij, is the identity utility from being in category c and   | 
      | is the 
disutility from diverging from the ideal effort level for category c, denoted e*(c). 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2005.) The parameter tC scales the loss of the utility (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2008). The firms profit function, the employee’s utility, the relation between 
worker effort and firm revenues and the information available to the firm are 
sufficient to determine the firm’s optimal wage payments to the worker (Akerlof and 
Kranton 2005).  
 
5.2 Including Workgroups and related Norms into Analysis 
 
Now following the ethnographies more closely and specifying the model even further 
to allow workgroups with their norms that restrict output and possibility for 
supervision like made by Akerlof and Kranton (2008). Let there be now a third action Γ. 
This is the behavioral norm for a workgroup, which is supported by the empirical 
observations previously presented. It is somewhere between the norms for insider and 
outsider, actions A and B respectively. Worker can conduct this workgroup action at a 
cost eΓ, where eA>eΓ>eB. Now lets assume the revenues for the firm: when the agent 
takes the action A, the firm’s revenues are high, πH, with probability 0,5 and low, πL, 
with probability 0,5. If agent takes the action B the firm’s revenue is always low πL.. 
When agent takes the workgroup action Γ, the probability of high-level revenues, πH, is 
γ/2 and of low-level, πL, is (1-γ/2), where 0≤γ≤1. The parameter γ represents how 
workgroup interaction and norms may reduce productivity. When γ is close to 1, the 
workgroup action is close to the action of the insiders, and in turn, when the γ is close 
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to 0, the workgroup norm is close to norm of the outsiders.  (Akerlof and Kranton 
2008.) 
 
“Following ethnographies and social psychology experiments, we assume that 
appointing a supervisor who reports on workers creates a rift between the worker and 
the firm: the agent adopts outsider identity” (Akerlof and Kranton 2008). The model 
was limited because of the assumption that the employee could primarily identify as 
an outsider or as a member of a workgroup. Let cWG equal G or O, workgroup or 
outsider identity respectively. The worker’s utility function was the following: 
 
(4)                    | 
        |, 
 
where there is no direct identity utility IJ and the effect of identity economics comes 
through the scaled disutility from differentiating the behavioral norms of the assigned 
social category,   | 
        |. (Akerlof and Kranton 2008.) The omitting of the 
identity utility, Ij, was not clearly motivated. The probable reasoning behind this is, that 
when insider identity is omitted in their analysis, the other social categories do not get 
positive identity utility as such from their actions. So the identity utility is basically 
scaled to zero. So when comparing equation (4) to (3), the identity utility is described 
with the scaled disutility from deviating from the behavioral norm, and therefore the 
identity utility can be zero at largest when people are acting according to their norms.  
 
Now adding the supervision into the model, let us assume for simplicity that it is cost 
free and successful with probability p, which is the probability with which supervisor 
can verify if the worker has chosen low-effort action. If verification is successful the 
worker can be fined amount f from his wage. This can be considered as a kind of 
retaliation like in the simple game theoretical model presented previously. Let the  
  
be the wage for the worker when revenues are high, and  
  wage when revenues are 
low. Principal’s expected profits for the case when observing outsider identity which is 
the outcome of the supervision are: 
 
(5)                       
    
  . 
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The participation constraint, which states that agent chooses to work for this company 
rather than for an outside opportunity instead,  ̅, is of the following form: 
 
(6)        
         
       |     |   ̅. (Akerlof and Kranton 2008.) 
 
 
This means that the expected utility for the worker has to be higher or equal than the 
utility he would be able to get from another workplace. The incentive constraint that 
the worker will prefer to pursue effort A rather than B is of the following form: 
 
(7)        
         
       |     |           
        
     
  .
14 
 
This describes that the expected utility for the high effort has to be larger or equal 
than the utility from the low-level effort. Finally the limited liability constraint is given 
by: 
 
(8)     
   , 
 
where b>0. This constrains the fines to a certain level  .  When all of these constraints 
(6) - (8) are binding, we have: 
 
(9)     
    
(10)   
     [
 
   
]   ̅           and 
(11)   
      {[
    
   
]   ̅                     [
  
   
]    }. 
 
                                                        
14  In Akerlof and Kranton (2008) the equation was given as:  
       
         
       | 
         |      
        
       , which is inconsistent. 
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From these equations (9) - (11) can be seen the trade-offs created by monitoring. As   
increases, the,  
  increases whereas the  
  decreases. Therefore the gap between 
wages decreases and thus lowers the cost of incentive pay for the principal. 
Simultaneously the strict supervision also tightens the participation constraint and the 
worker with the outsider identity must be compensated more to perform action A, 
namely the scaled gap of eA-eB. This is more than would be needed for incentive pay in 
case without supervision when workgroup norms would exists and the difference 
would be smaller than eA- eΓ. (Akerlof and Kranton 2008.) 
 
 
Now consider a case where principal does not supervise the worker, so by assumption 
based on the ethnographies mentioned previously, workers adopt workgroup identity 
and their ideal conduct is of medium-level effort, Γ with cost of eΓ. The possibilities for 
the principal are either to pay higher wage to induce workers to select the high-effort 
action A or let them perform the workgroup norm. The equations for firm’s profits, 
worker’s participation constraint and incentive constraint are following: 
 
(12)                       
    
  , 
 
(13)        
         
       |     |   ̅, 
 
(14)        
         
       |     |  (
 
 
)     
     
 
 
     
  
   and, 
 
(15)        
         
       |     |      
       |     |. 
 
Incentive to choose action A over action Γ is shown in constraint (14) and incentive to 
choose action A over action B in (15). These constraints show the costs and benefits to 
the principal of no supervision, since the supervision makes it more costly for the 
principal to induce the high-effort action when the worker considers himself as an 
outsider. Worker’s ideal effort Γ is higher than B, but no information from agent’s 
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action is received. When γ is sufficiently close to 1, the (14) is the tighter constraint 
and when it and (13) are binding the optimal wages are: 
 
(16)   
      { ̅       |     |  [
    
   
]        } 
(17)   
      { ̅       |     |  [
    
   
]        }.  
(Akerlof and Kranton 2008.) 
 
Comparison with previous wages shows one reason for lower wage costs. Because (eA- 
eΓ) is less than (eA-eB), the participation constraint is relaxed. The equations also show 
that eliciting action A from workgroup can be difficult, since the difference between 
wages is: 
 
(18)     
      
          [
    
   
]. 
 
So the incentive wage to choose action A may get quite large, especially when γ 
approaches unity, meaning that the workgroup norm is near the high-level effort. This 
is because high revenues are realized more often, so it becomes costly to compensate 
for high effort. The choices that are left are either to monitor or let the worker 
perform the workgroup norm Γ. With no supervision the firm can elicit Γ with a lower 
wage differential than it would take to elicit action A with supervision. There exists an 
effort cost of Γ over B, (eΓ-eB), which is partially offset by tG<1 by the utility gain of 
  |     |. The incentive constraint of Γ relative to B is: 
 
(19) 
 
 
    
     
 
 
     
         
       |     |. 
 
If this constraint (19) is binding, the difference in log wages is: 
 
(20)     
      
                  . (Akerlof and Kranton 2008.) 
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5.3 Results from the Analysis 
 
So if the γ is fairly close to one, meaning that the workgroup norm is near the high-
level effort, or if the tG is fairly high, meaning that the negative identity utility from 
deviating from the internalized norm is larger, or if the cost for workgroup effort is 
close to the outsider effort, principal would prefer to elicit the workgroup norm Γ 
rather than the high-effort action A. Comparing the options of principal, there exist 
p’>0,  such that for all lower values of p, the principal would prefer not to supervise. 
This is so although supervisor could possibly detect low-effort action, but since 
supervision can lead into resentful workforce, which identify against the company as 
outsiders, eliciting performance from a workgroup may be relatively inexpensive. 
(Akerlof and Kranton 2008.)  
 
So the outcome of this specified model is that even though the workgroup may have 
ideals and norms that are different than the principal has, the optimal outcome for the 
principal might be to let them work according to the norms, since the other outcomes 
could prove costly. This is supported by the ethnographies and studies that were 
presented on the empirical part of the paper. The model is based on the malleability 
that subjects can easily be transferred from social category to another and that 
management policy can affect these identifications. (Akerlof and Kranton 2008.) 
 
 
6 CRITISISM 
 
In addition to praises that Akerlof and Kranton were the firsts to introduce a 
generalized economics analysis framework, where they systematically introduce the 
concept of identity as an argument in the utility function and all the new research that 
has been conducted and publishes after their series of articles, their framework and 
models have also received criticism. Most of it is towards the concept of identity they 
incorporate into the economic model. The critique is that since their concept of 
identity based on social categories and the norms that are observed and enforced are 
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related to social context also, therefore it is the concept of social identity and not the 
total identity of individuals. The people's personal identities are omitted in the 
analysis. (Davis 2007 and Aguiar et al. 2010.) Part of the criticism is also towards the 
concept of identity, which is used in many fields of study with different notations and 
explaining different things (Aguiar et al. 2010). There is also criticism towards how 
people actually see the ideal norms and characteristics in relation to their actual 
behavior (Aguiar et al. 2010). One should also be critical towards using of empirical 
evidence and inserting noneconomic motivations as a basis for new economic theory. 
These topics are covered shortly in the next four chapters.  
 
 
6.1 Total Identity consists both of Personal and of Social Identity 
 
The Akerlof and Kranton's framework as well as other literature on economics and 
identity have mainly been influenced by theories from social psychology (Aguiar et al. 
2010). This means that although Akerlof and Kranton speak about person’s self-image 
and identity overall, these terms are still both linked to social categories. As people 
identify with some and differentiate from others, the concept they incorporated into 
the analysis is the social identity one. In many critical papers it has been stated that in 
the framework the personal identity, person's sense of self without others, is omitted. 
Formally in the framework the self as a whole is the utility function,  , and the 
identity component    does not depend on   , because of this the identity as a self-
image is not reflexive. The self-image in the framework reflects how well individual’s 
characteristics or actions match the ideal characteristics or actions of certain social 
category, and therefore “    might better be labeled as a social image of the self which 
the individual adopts.” (Davis 2007.) 
 
Total identity is not only based on social context, but individual's personal identity 
matters also, since “social identity is only a portion of the identity of a person” (Aguiar 
et al. 2010.) The interpretation of self-image should therefore not be confused with the 
often used idea of self as a whole. The social identity, person identifying with others, is 
different from personal identity, individual’s identifications without others. In social 
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identity there exist similar commonalities between members of a social category 
differences between categories. Personal identity refers more to individual level, self as 
different from other people overall. (Davis 2007.) It could also be considered as a kind 
of reference between multiple social identities, since given the consensus that people 
can have multiple identities personal identity should be used as reference for the social 
identities. So it would state which category and therefore which norms individual ould 
choose to or not to follow in different situations. (Aquiar et al. 2010.) If there is no 
account of the “bearer” of the social identities, how could one rank between multiple 
social identities (Davis 2007). Personal identity would tell us how the individual would 
fit the action to the image that individual wants to have about oneself (see Sen 2004 
and Teschl 2006). (Aguair et al. 2010.) 
 
Social identity theory generally does not consider relation between personal and social 
identity, and also as the self-categorization theory depersonalizes the individuals when 
they adopt social identities, creates embodiments of group prototypes rather than as 
independent individuals. (Davis 2007.) Individual’s personal identity refers to his self-
categories which are based on his differences from other individuals and determine 
him as a unique person. Social identity in turn refers to social categorization of oneself 
and others, which is based on shared similarities between members of the same group 
as well as differentiations to members of other categories. (Turner 1999.) As this social 
identity theory is more of a psychological one, and distinguishes between in- and out-
groups, It allows people to have multiple identities, but the relation between them is 
not explained. (Davis 2007.) 
 
Davis argues that in sociological approach people can also have multiple relations to 
others, which cannot be just restricted into yes or no group memberships. In 
sociological approach to identity there is a mutual and interactive relation between the 
self and society, both influencing each other. Individuals’ actions are always in social 
context through different social structures, which are conceptualized in terms of 
different social phenomena. The basic idea is that individual’s personal identity and 
society affect each other, and therefore person is seen to have a status also without 
social context, personal identity. Using this concept Davis inverted the utility function 
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and created a new production function which would then cover all the identities. His 
argument was that the previous scope of Akerlof and Kranton is limited as in social 
psychology’s literature there is much evidence that people re-order their social 
identities when in conflicts, and not just act accordingly to the norms they have from 
existing social rankings.  (Davis 2007.) 
 
6.2 The Vague Concept of Identity 
 
The concept of identity in addition its use in common language is widely used in many 
fields like sociology, political science and psychology. It is used as a concept to explain 
how people see themselves and how they relate to each other, for socially constructed 
meaning which is based on biological aspects like gender or race, as a term for 
identification with national, cultural or linguistic symbols, as a cognitive schema by 
which people see the world, different forms and understandings of oneself, as a 
prescriptive representation of political actors and much more. (Aguiar et al. 2010.) The 
term identity is therefore widely used in explaining different things (Brubaker and 
Cooper 2000). Only in economics the term is used as payoffs or outcomes, set of social 
groups and categories, internalized social norms for behavior, as beliefs in profound 
personal value, as a perpetual lens or as non-instrumental deontological elements of 
action. These multiple usages and definitions of the term raise the question about the 
usefulness and efficiency of the whole concept explaining the causality between 
identity and action. (Aguiar et al. 2010.) 
 
Also there is difference in the meaning of the term depending on if it is used as 
categories of practice or as categories of analysis. It is hard to differentiate if the term 
identity is used as describing the people's everyday life and how they see themselves in 
their economic, social or political practices or whether it describes the analytical 
concept that is part of the theory of social action. Aguair et al. consider that this 
difference would be good to clarify, whether the researcher has given the category for 
a person or is the term used to describe how the person actually sees oneself as an 
outcome of true process of self-categorization. (Aguiar et al. 2010.) 
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6.3 Difference between the Norms and Actual Behavior 
 
Aguiar et al. (2010) conducted a study about personal identity using dictator game and 
the identity economics framework of Akerlof and Kranton. Their focus was on personal 
identity, since in their critique, like previously mentioned, they consider that the 
concept of individual’s personal identity has been omitted in the Akerlof and Kranton 
framework. They used dictator game, where subjects get real money to be distributed 
among themselves and anonymous counterparty. They have to decide how much 
money they keep for themselves and how much to give away. In the experiment 
subjects were first asked, what they thought, how much they should give and keep. 
This was then followed by actions. In the former part, using the terminology of the 
identity economics framework, subjects gave insight to the behavioral norms about 
how they should act. This was then used as prescriptions for behavior. Conducting the 
experiment in a way where the social distance is large, since the subjects are without 
any information about the counterparty, their personal identity is revealed more 
clearly through their self-definition and self-understanding. (Aguair et al. 2010.) This 
setup was without social context since in another experiment using dictator game with 
hypothetical money and where social context was allowed the results were that 
subjects give more money to those people, who are in a wide range of social categories 
more similar to them (Ben-Ner et al. 2006). 
 
Aguair et al. used identity here as an analytical category and grouped the subjects into 
different categories according their answers and decisions. They defined personal 
identity to be what the subject says he should do. They assumed that one key aspect of 
identity economics framework is the coherency between one’s personal identity, based 
on answers about what they consider they should do and then the actual action 
observed. They considered people’s identities unstable if they do not act accordingly to 
the norms they have themselves stated. The result was that conduct differed largely 
from the norms. Majority of the subjects did not donate half to their counterparties 
although majority of subjects also stated that they should donate half. The fact that 
people did not act according the common codes of conducts they themselves 
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determined, casts doubts about the concept of identity and the fact that it might 
conceal other drivers for behavior like interests, beliefs and values. (Aguair et al.  
2010.) 
 
Social categories can explain the economic and noneconomic behavior of individuals to 
some extent, but there is a wide margin for discretion. Using large social categories like 
gender or race the individual’s personal identity or his identification with values, 
interests and desires could be more suitable framework. As the results about personal 
identity as a driver for behavior in many examples and cases explain the decision 
making of people, but using it as explaining concept on individual decision-making level 
raises contradictions. (Aguiar 2010.) The critique here is a little contradicting. Firstly 
they say that identity economics is based on social categories and person's sense of 
self should also be considered, but secondly, the results of their experiment do not 
support the fact that on personal norm level, people would act according to them. In 
the experiment it can of course be so that the answers given about the ideal behavior 
were not the actual norms for the subjects but more like ideals of a perfect world. It 
can also be that the answers reflect how the subjects would have liked others to 
behave. One supporting factor to use identity more on social level than on personal 
level is the group pressure which can support the behavioral norms in decisions where 
social context matters since it can force people to align around certain identity out of 
group benefits of obligation (Aguiar 2010). 
 
6.4 Overall Comments about Identity in Economics 
 
Economic theories and the models are simplified projections of reality so that they can 
be used in explaining the decision-making of individuals. The preferences of individuals 
cover the incentives that individuals have. By adding identity into the standard utility 
function the framework can explain the behavior individuals more than standard 
models would do, but standard models could also cover these topics. Rationality is not 
assumed in economics, but it is more of a methodological stance. This reflects the 
decision of economist to “view the individual as the unit of agency and investigate the 
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interaction of the purposeful behaviors of d iﬀerent individuals within various 
economic institutions.” The methodological usefulness of this decision can be 
questioned by challenging an individual model or the economics’ combined outcomes. 
There are numerous ways to incorporate changes into individual preferences in 
economics by assuming that they depend on “an exogenous state variable, on the 
information of his opponents, or his own consumption history.” It can be that the 
economists’ concept of individual is not suitable for psychologists’ goals and it is not 
even necessary that economist should incorporate the goals and methods from 
psychology. “Greater psychological realism is not an appropriate modeling criterion for 
economics.” (Gul and Pesendorfer 2008.) 
 
 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to show how economics together with the concept of 
social identity can explain decision-making. I have presented the Akerlof and Kranton’s 
seminal framework of identity economics and the specified models that have followed 
are part of the behavioral economics in the sense that they incorporate noneconomic 
motivations for behavior into economic modelling and base the motivation for the 
model on empirical and experimental findings. However their framework differs from 
the most of the behavioral economics of today, since it does not deviate far from the 
standard economics when they incorporate the identity based on social categories into 
the utility function as an endogenous variable. The concept of identity they incorporate 
is based on the social psychology’s studies about identity, social identity approach, 
which constitutes of two psychological theories: the social identity theory and self-
categorization theory. These theories motivate how people see themselves as part of 
groups and how their thinking and feelings relate to the norms they observe and 
internalize. This structured way of incorporating social context into economics creating 
the augmented utility function brings clearly defined concepts from noneconomic 
science into the analysis. As economics have usually been careful not to extend their 
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models too much, this addition offers nice and structured framework which can be 
used in explaining peoples’ behavior.   
 
Their framework is useful in the sense that it helps to explain behavior that is 
observed, but cannot directly be explained using the standard economic outcomes. As 
people are often tied to a social context, taking this into account in the utility function 
is also reasonable. The addition of identity can describe the individuals’ preferences 
regarding their behavior more than normally in an economic model. This like in many 
empirical cases seen previously can shed some light into behavior that would seem 
irrational or illogical for others, if their identities differ. This can explain behavior in 
different kinds of organizations, as well as between races, voter behavior in politics or 
relationship between consumers and advertisers.  
 
Although the framework has received criticism that the concept of identity it tries to 
incorporate is not in psychological sense the concept of individuals whole identity, in 
my opinion restricting the framework just to consider social context is reasonable. 
People interact so that social context is usually present, and in explaining the behavior 
it is good to consider peoples’ opinions how they think they should behave. As the 
critique is right in the sense, that in the framework Akerlof and Kranton have omitted 
the individuals’ personal identity, which could be used in order to determine relations 
between multiple social identities, I think one should make this restriction to ensure 
less complexity in the framework. This is why I think their framework should be 
considered as the theory of social identity economics. 
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